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T WAS said by Chief Justice Hughes in 1916 that the distinctive legal
development of this era is that our activities are largely controlled by
federal or state administrative agencies and that as a result a host of
controversies as to private rights are no longer decided in courts.' In the
same year Elihu Root, then President of the American Bar Association,
stated that we were entering upon the creation of a body of administrative
law different in its machinery, its remedies, and its safeguards, from the
old methods of regulation by specific statutes enforced by the courts.
He added:
The powers that are committed to these regulating agencies, and which they must
have to do their work, carry with them great and dangerous opportunities of oppres-
sion and wrong.2
During the period which has intervened since these statements were made
the multiplication of federal administrative agencies, a term used in this
article to include executive departments and bureaus, administrative
courts, and administrative commissions, has been such as to cause in-
creased alarm to some.3
II
It is not to be expected that parties desiring to protect their rights be-
fore administrative agencies, either as petitioners or claimants on the one
hand or respondents on the other, should be compelled to appear in person
* Dean of the Law School of the University of Arkansas.
z Frankfurter and Davison, Cases on Administrative Law vii, i4 (1932). See also Frank-
furter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 184 (1928); Willoughby, Judicial Ad-
ministration x8 (1929).
2 Presidential address, 41 Rep. Am. Bar Assn. 355, 368-369 (ig96).
3 "The legislation enacted during the first session of the 73d Congress, ending June 6, 1933'
represents an advance of federal administrative machinery, on a scale and to an extent never
before attempted, into fields not heretofore brought under federal regulation." 58 Rep. Am.
Bar Assn. 407, 408 (1933); 59 id. 539 (1934).
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for that purpose;4 and especially not in those cases in which the govern-
ment is represented by officials supposedly appointed because of their
technical qualifications in the particular field. Therefore what type of
persons may represent parties before the varied administrative agencies?
This article will be confined to a consideration of the bars of federal ad-inistrative agencies.5 Due to the vast number of these federal agencies
only a few will be considered, as this article is not a current handbook on
the standards of admission and disbarment of the numerous federal ad-
ministrative bars.7
The privilege to practice before federal administrative agencies is gov-
erned by the rules of particular agencies. If a party does not desire to
represent himself he must seek a practitioner enrolled in the bar of such
an agency or recognized by the agency as one qualified to practice before
it.8 Whether an administrative agency has the "inherent power" 9 to con-
trol admission and disbarment, as has been alleged to exist in the courts,
has perhaps not been answered.
In 1884 Congress enacted legislation pertaining to "departmental prac-
tice ' I ° before the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of the In-
terior and empowered them to prescribe rules governing the recognition of
agents or attorneys representing claimants. These acts provided that the
secretaries may require applicants to show that they are of good moral
character and possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to
render claimants valuable service and otherwise competent to assist the
claimants in the presentation of their claims."
4 "In the absence of legislation by Congress, there is probably a right on the part of a
claimant to be represented by an agent or attorney in presenting his claim before one of the
executive departments." 33 Op. Atty. Gen. 17, 10 (i921). See also Manning v. French, 149
Mass. 39I, 21 N.E. 945 (i889), dismissed 133 U.S. i86 (i8go).
5 For the use of this term, see: Pfiffner, Public Administration 395 (I935). See also for a
discussion of federal administrative bars: Robinson, Lawyers and Practitioners, A Study in
Contrasts, 21 Am. Bar Assn. J. 277 (1935).
6 For a proposal to edit such a handbook see 59 Rep. Am. Bar Assn. 539, 555, 56i (1934).
7 For a list of these administrative agencies see 59 Rep. Am. Bar Assn. 556-562 (1934);
Congressional Directory (i935); U.S. Govt. Manual (1935).
9 Sec. 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, governing federal courts, provided that "the parties
may plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of such counsel or
attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and
conduct causes therein." Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, § 35; 1 Stat. 92; 28 U.S.C.A. § 394
(1928).
9 For a discussion of this term see Waterman, The Federal Bar, 2o Am. Bar Assn. J. 762,
764 (1934), note 3Y. See also 66 A. L. R. 1512 (1930).
20 i Hughes, Federal Practice § 202 (i931). For the departments which do not require for-
mal admission to their bars see Clark, Departmental Practice: Admission of Attorneys, 9 Am.
Bar Assn. J. 7o6 (1923).
"23 Stat. 1o1 (1884); 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 261, 493 (1927).
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In Garfield v. United States ex. rel. Stevens,12 in 19o8, it was said of this
act: "Nor is it necessary to consider whether the Secretary [of the Interi-
or], who in these matters is vested with judicial power, and whose rela-
tions to attorneys practicing before his department are substantially the
same as that of a court to attorneys admitted to its bar, has any inherent
power in such matters of which the statute is merely declaratory.' '13
In Phillips v. Ballinger,14 a case decided in 1911, it was said by the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia that the act of 1884 giving the Sec-
retary of the Interior power over admission of attorneys and agents was
nothing more than legislative sanction of a previous practice of the de-
partment. The court, however, stated that the source of the depart-
ment's power to prescribe rules of admission prior to 1884 came from an
earlier act which authorized the head of each executive department to
prescribe departmental regulations.'
In some instances a particular bureau within a department, such as the
Patent Office' 6 which is now under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Commerce, 7 has been given authority by statute to prescribe rules, sub-
ject to the approval of the secretary of the department, governing the
recognition of attorneys and agents.' 8
The Board of Tax Appeals, created as an administrative agency in the
executive branch of the government, but independent of any depart-
ment' 9 and described as an administrative court,20 was not invested by
Congress with express authority to prescribe rules for the admission of
practitioners. In Goldsmith, Certified Public Accountant v. Board of Tax
Appeals, 2 the petitioner alleged that the board was not empowered to
32 App. D. C. iog (i9o8).
13 32 App. D. C. iog, 14- (igo8). See note 15, infra. X4 37 App. D. C. 46, 49 (19II).
's5 U.S.C.A. § 22 (1927). See also 5 U.S.C.A. § 481. 13 Op. Atty. Gen. I5O (I869); i6
Op. Atty. Gen. 488 (i88o); Walker, Law Making in the United States 453 (I934); Butler v.
White, 83 Fed. 578, 581 (C. C. W.Va. 1897).
16 32 Stat. 830 (19o3); 5 U.S.C.A. § 485 (1927).
1742 Stat. 1109 (1923); 5 U.S.C.A. § 597 (1927).
x8 42 Stat. 390 (1922); 35 U.S.C.A. § 11 (1929).
1944 Stat. o5 (1926); 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1211, 1212 (1928).
20 To the effect that the Board of Tax Appeals is an administrative court, see McGuire,
Judicial Reviews of Federal Administrative Action, ig Am. Bar Assn. J. 471, 472 (i933). See
also 42 Yale L. J. 125, 127 (1932); Radin, The Courts and Administrative Agencies, 23 Calif.
L. Rev. 469,474 (1935); Appeal of So. Cal. Loan Assn., 4 B. T. A. 223, 234 (926). Cf.45 Harv.
L. Rev. 122Y, 1223 (i93i), note ig; Blachly and Oatman, Administrative Legislation and
Adjudication 122, 126 (1934).
See also Board of Tax Appeals v. United States ex rel. Shults Bread Co., 37 F. (2d) 442
(App. D. C. 1930); Comm. of Internal Revenue v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 59 F. (2d) 320
(C.C.A. 6th 1932).
21270 U.S. 117 (1926).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
adopt rules of admission, because since such power was expressly con-
ferred by statute on the Secretary of the Treasury 22 the failure to confer it
on the board revealed a legislative intent denying such power to the
board. The Supreme Court said, however, that since the board was in-
vested with the power to prescribe rules of procedure by which to conduct
business there was impliedly included therein the power to adopt rules for
admission of attorneys and agents.23
The Interstate Commerce Act not only invests the commission with
authority to make rules of procedure, but expressly provides that "any
party may appear before the commission or any division thereof and be
heard in person or by attorney. ' '24 The act creating the Federal Trade
Commission, while not conferring on the commission power to adopt rules
of procedure, provides that any person may intervene, upon permission,
when a complaint has been filed by the commission and appear in the pro-
ceedings "by counsel2s or in person.
' '2 6
III
Since federal administrative agencies, either when empowered to pre-
scribe rules of admission or when empowered to adopt rules of procedure,
have the authority to determine who shall practice before them, the next
problem to consider is the actual exercise of the power. In other words,
what classes of persons may apply for admission to these federal adminis-
trative bars and what qualifications must they possess before they are
enrolled, registered or recognized?
In general it is provided that corporations2 7 and firms will not be ad-
mitted nor recognized and that the applicant must be a citizen or resident
of the United States21 and of good moral character. As a rule an attorney
at law who applies for admission must state whether he has ever been dis-
"Note 13, supra.
23 45 Stat. 872 (1928); 26 U.S.C.A. § 1219 (a) (1928).
24 41 Stat. 492 (192); 4 9 U.S.C.A. § 17 (1) (1929). For the power of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission to prescribe rules of procedure see 48 Stat. xo68 (x934); 47 U.S.C.A. § 154
(1) (1928).
2sBlachly and Oatman, Administrative Legislation and Adjudication 77 (1934). See note
4o, infra, which points out that only attorneys at law are admitted to practice before the Fed-
eral Trade Commission.
2643 Stat. 939 (1924); 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (I927). For the nature of controversies before the
Federal Trade Commission, see Fed. Trade Comm. v. Klesner, 28o 1J.S. 19 (1929).
27 Cf. Public Service Traffic Bureau, Inc. v. Haworth Marble Co., 4o Ohio App. 255, 178
N.E. 703 (1931).
28 For the oath to be taken by members of administrative bars, see 12 Stat. 6io (1862); 31
U.S.C.A. § 204 (1927); § 3 (d), Treas. Dept. Circ. no. 230, 4 (1934).
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barred or suspended in any court, and by some administrative agencies a
similar statement is required as to suspension or disbarment by a depart-
ment or agency of the United States.2 9
The acts of 1884 empowering the Secretaries of the Treasury and of the
Interior to adopt rules of admission prescribe that the applicants, who are
described as "agents, attorneys, or other persons," must show that they
possess the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to claimants
valuable service and are competent to advise and assist them in the pres-
entation of their claims.3° In addition the regulations of the Treasury De-
partment provide that:
while practice before the Treasury Department is not restricted to duly licensed attor-
neys at law and certified public accountants, agents who are neither .... will not be
enrolled unless they are able to present .... convincing evidence that they possess
the educational background, technical knowledge, and ability essential to the proper
understanding and presentation of Federal tax questions.3t
The Patent Office 32 designates all those who represent others before it
as "patent attorneys," though the act authorizing it to make rules govern-
ing the recognition of persons representing applicants describes such rep-
resentatives as "agents, attorneys or other persons. '33 The Patent Office
will register as attorneys those who possess the necessary legal and scien-
tific qualifications to render applicants valuable service. In order to deter-
mine whether a person seeking to be registered as a patent attorney
possesses these qualifications examinations are conducted. No person is
permitted to take the examination unless he submits proof of sufficient
basic training in scientific and technical matters. In the case of a person
who has served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office
the examination may be dispensed with.34
The Commissioner of Public Lands, an official in the Department of the
Interior,35 has formulated rules of admission permitting two classes of
persons to practice before his bureau. A person who desires to represent a
29 Rule 2, Rules of Practice, United States Board of Tax App. i (I935). See note 38, infra.
30 23 Stat. 101, 258 (1884); 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 261, 493 (1927).
31 Sec. 3, Treas. Dept. Circ. no. 230, 3 (i934).
3242 Stat. 11o9 (1922); 5 U.S.C.A. § 597 (i927).
33 42 Stat. 390 (1922); 35 U.S.C.A. § 11 (i929). See note 67, infra.
34 Rule 17, Rules of Practice, U.S. Pat. Off. 4 ('935). See Robinson, Lawyers and Practi-
tioners, 21 Am. Bar Assn. J. 277, 278 (1935) for a discussion of the method of conducting this
examination.
3s 43 U.S.C.A. § z (1928). 50 C. J. 1076 (1930); Pierce, The Land Department as an Admin-
istrative Tribunal, io Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 271, 278 (i918); McClintock, The Administrative
Determination of Public Land Controversies, 9 Minn. L. Rev. 542, 551 (1924).
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claimant before a district land office must file a certificate with the local
register of lands36 that he is an attorney at law in good standing. If he is
not an attorney at law he must file a certificate executed by a judge of a
United States court, a state or a territorial court having common-law
jurisdiction, except a probate court, to the effect that he is a person pos-
sessing the necessary qualifications to render his client valuable services
in the presentation of claims. 37
The Board of Tax Appeals registers attorneys at law who are admitted
to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States or the highest
court of any state or territory or the District of Columbia and also "certi-
fied public accountants duly qualified under the law of any state or terri-
tory or the District of Columbia.'
38
The Federal Trade Commission confines practice before it to attorneys
at law, though under its rule on "appearance" the Commission, in its dis-
cretion may permit a party upon application and for good cause shown to
be represented by a person having the requisite qualifications to represent
others.39 Perhaps this rule is due to the fact that the act of Congress 40
creating the commission provides that persons who intervene may appear
in person or by "counsel" and does not refer to "agent, attorney, or other
person" as in other acts.4'
The Interstate Commerce Commission registers two classes of practi-
tioners; one consists of attorneys at law and the other class consists of
those persons "possessed of the necessary legal and technical qualifica-
tions" to enable them to render valuable service before the commission
and otherwise competent to assist in the presentation of matters before
the commission. 42 In 1929 the Interstate Commerce Commission pre-
3643 Stat. 1145 (1924); 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 71, 72 (1928).
'7 Circulars and Regulations of the General Land Office 167, 174 (1930). See also 18 Stat.
317 (1875); 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 2, 1201 (1928); 5 U.S.C.A. §§485, 493 (1927); Regs. Dept. Int.
Governing Recognition of Agents and Attorneys (1927).
Twenty-four persons were admitted to the land office practice for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1932. Ann. Rep. Comm. of Gen. Land Office 4 (1932).
's Rule 2, Rules of Practice, U.S. Board of Tax App. 1 (1935).
The certified public accountant must state in his application whether he has been expelled
from any professional society of public accountants or his right to practice has been revoked in
any jurisdiction or by any department or agency of the United States. See note 29, supra.
For the various state statutes governing the qualifications of certified public accountants,
see: Certified Public Accountant Laws (193o); Green, History of Accountancy 77, 166, 191
,
222 (1930); Yearbook Am. Inst. of Accountancy 268 (1932).
39 Rules 2 and 3, Rules, Policy and Acts, Fed. Trade Comm. 1 (1934).
40 See note 25, supra. 4' 23 Stat. 258, 101 (1884); 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 261, 493 (1927).
42 Rule I-B, Rules of Practice, I. C. C. 4 (1932). See note 24, supa.
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scribed a register for all admitted to practice before it. From September i,
1929 to December i, 1930, 4,351 persons were entered upon the register.
Of these only 1,765 were admitted upon presentation of certificates show-
ing admission to the courts; the remainder were admitted upon showings
as to their qualifications. 43
IV
This article does not purport to discuss whether the various administra-
tive agencies, which have been vested with the power to prescribe qualifi-
cations for admission and also with the discretionary power of determining
whether the applicant is qualified, have exercised these powers in such a
manner as to assure to claimants or petitioners a competent administra-
tive bar from which to select. It has been said, however, that "as the ideal
that administrators possess technical skill in the fields in which they deal
has come nearer realization, the practitioners in those fields have also de-
veloped a competence for their tasks. Important administrative tribunals
now have before them specialized groups of counsel. ' ' 44
It is to be noted that the rules of admission for practice before the ad-
ministrative agencies, even when based on acts of Congress which specifi-
cally set forth the qualifications of applicants for admission to practice,
vest almost unlimited discretion in the official who passes on the qualifica-
tions. In only one instance, it is believed, has the procedure of written ex-
aminations been adopted as prerequisite for admission to an administra-
tive bar.45
The Attorney General in 192I in an opinion, based on the act of 188446
pertaining to the Treasury Department, stated that since the act required
notice and hearing only in disbarment proceedings, it was to be inferred
that it was not the intention of Congress that a hearing be granted in
43 44 Ann. Rep., I. C. C. 74 (1930).
"From October x6, 1932, to October z5, 1933, 4o5 applicants were admitted to practise
before the Interstate Commerce Commission. Of these, 242 were admitted upon presentation
of certificates showing admission to practice in the courts, and 163 upon showing as to qualifi-
cations." 47 ibid. 34 ('933).
44 McFarland, Administrative Agencies in Government, 59 Rep. Am. Bar Assn. 326, 345
(1934). The practitioners before the Interstate Commerce Commission formed an association
in 1929; at that time a code of professional ethics modeled upon the code of the American Bar
Association was adopted. 44 Ann. Rep. I. C. C. 74 (1930). See the I. C. C. Practitioners'
Journal, Washington, D.C. Cf. Reed, Training for the Public Profession of the Law 297
(1921).
4s For a requirement of written examinations for admission to a federal district court bar,
see: 4 Bar Examiner 423 (1935). See Rule 17(c), Rules of Practice, U.S. Pat. Off. 4 (1935);
note 34, supra.
46 23 Stat. 258 (1884); 5 U.S.C.A. § 261 (1927).
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passing on an application. 47 By a regulation of the Treasury Department
the Secretary has delegated to a committee of three, known as the com-
mittee on enrollment and disbarment, control over admission. The regu-
lation provides that the committee may grant a hearing on an application
at the applicant's request.48 The Attorney General in this opinion would
not express his views on the right of an applicant to review by a court of
the decision of the Treasury Department upon a refusal to enroll an appli-
cant or upon disbarment of a member of that administrative bar.
The rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission provide that if the
commission is not satisfied with the sufficiency of the applicant's qualifica-
tions he is entitled, on request, to a hearing for the purpose of showing his
qualifications.49 By statute, if an applicant for admission to practice be-
fore the Commissioner of Patents is refused recognition he is entitled to a
review of his petition before the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia.so
When the register of a district land office refuses to enroll an applicant
to practice, the application, under the rules of the Department of' the
Interior, must be forwarded to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, who notifies the applicant and permits him to file a reply.51 The
regulations of the Department of the Interior provide that the action of
all bureau heads on admission must be forwarded to the Secretary of the
Interior "for his consideration and action thereon. ''
2
In Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals 3 the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1926 stated that the rule of the board which provides that in its
discretion it might deny admission to any person not possessing the requi-
site qualifications or lacking in good character, must be construed to mean
a discretion:
to be exercised after fair investigation, with such a notice, hearing and opportunity to
answer for the applicant as would constitute due process.54
In view of the fact that the granting of the application for admission to a
federal administrative bar is within the discretion of a department or bu-
47 33 Op. Atty. Gen. 17, I9 (1921).
48 Secs. 1, 3(c), Treas. Dept. Cir. no. 230, i, 3 (1934).
49 Rule I-B (4), Rules of Practice, I. C. C. 3 (1932).
so 42 Stat. 390 (1922); 35 U.S.C.A. § i (1929).
See notes 35, 36, 37, supra.
s2 Sec. 5, Regs. Dept. Int. Governing Recognition of Agents and Attys. 3 (1927). See also
note 63, infra.
53 270 U.S. 117 (1926). S4 270 U.S. 17, 123 (1926).
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reau head or a commission, and is not based on examination, the right to a
hearing on the application seems justifiedss
In a discussion before the United States Senate in i93i on admission to
practice before the Patent Office, it was stated that the applicants should
be subject to examination as in admission to the bar of a court56 This
view was based on the allegation that the Commissioner of Patents was
vested with too great discretionary power in determining whether the ap-
plicant should be admitted to practice before his bureau5 7 If examina-
tions were substituted for the discretionary action of the administrative
agency, it is submitted that this would serve as sufficient hearing on the
technical qualifications of the applicant s'
V
Since petitioners and claimants must select their agents or attorneys
from the bar authorized to practice before the particular administrative
agency, they should be assured not only that those admitted possess the
necessary qualifications to render valuable service in the presentation of
their claims but also that they have retained these qualifications. Accord-
ingly in a case involving the Court of Alabama Claims it was held that
since Congress had granted to this commission the power to make rules of
procedure, the commission had the power to prescribe the qualifications of
those appearing before it, to determine whether the applicant possessed
those qualities, and also whether he had retained the requisite qualifi-
cations.59
The congressional acts of 1884 investing the Secretaries of the Treasury
and of the Interior with control over admission specifically gave them
power to suspend and disbar but only after notice and hearing.6o
ss "In general, no hearing is required upon an application for license to practice a profession,
trade or occupation ..... But, to revoke a license, notice and opportunity to be beard must
be afforded the licensee." Right to Hearing on Application for Admission to Practice before
Administrative Tribunals, 24 Mich. L. Rev. 846 (1926). "It is true that notice and hearing is
generally required for the revocation (though not for the refusal) of a license ..... " 21 I. L.
Rev. 493 (1926).
s
6 In 1934 the Patent Office prescribed examination for applicants. See Rule I7(h), Rules of
Practice, U.S. Pat. Off. 5 (1933). See note 34, supra.
7 74 Cong. Rec. 5723-5725 (1931).
ss It might be argued that while an examination would determine technical qualifications
for admission to the bar, the administrative agency could act in an arbitrary manner with re-
gard to moral qualifications and therefore that a hearing should be permitted if the applicant
is rejected for the latter reason. Cf. Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U.S. 110 (1922).
s9 Manning v. French, 149 Mass. 391, 21 N.E. 945 (1889), dismissed 133 U.S. 186 (i89o).
62 23 Stat. 258, ioi (z884); 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 261, 493 (1927).
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In the Treasury Department the committee of three, composed of
subordinate officials, is constituted a committee on enrollment and dis-
barment. An enrolled agent or attorney against whom disbarment pro-
ceedings have been instituted may be represented at the hearing by an
attorney. The report of the committee on disbarment is submitted to the
Secretary of the Treasury for approval. Upon disbarment, notice of the
same is given to all interested branches of the government.6
The acts of 1884 provide- that the department may suspend or disbar
any agent or attorney:
shown to be incompetent, disreputable, or who refuses to comply with the said rules
and regulations, or who shall with intent to defraud in any manner, deceive, mislead,
or threaten any claimant, or prospective claimant, by word, circular, letter, or by ad-
vertisement.
The rules of the Treasury Department adopted in pursuance of this act
list fifty-seven grounds for reprimand, suspension, and disbarment, which
include action contrary to the canons of ethics of the'American Bar Asso-
ciation, advertising of certain types, disbarment by a court of record, can-
cellation of the certificate of a certified public accountant, disbarment or
suspension by another department or agency of the government, or con-
duct showing the attorney or agent to be disreputable or incompetent.
6 2
The rules of the Department of the Interior provide that if any bureau
head recommends that an agent or attorney be disbarred the record and
recommendations shall be transmitted to the Secretary for action.63
As previously stated, the act of 1922 investing the Commissioner of
Patents with control over admission and disbarment expressly confers on
the agent or attorney who has been disbarred the right to a review by the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.64 By an act of 1870 the action
of the Commissioner of Patents in disbarring a "patent-agent," the word
attorney not appearing in the statute, was subject to the approval of the
secretary of the department.6s By an act of 1861 the action of the Com-
missioner of Patents in disbarring a "patent-agent" was subject to the
approval of the President of the United States.6 6 Practitioners before the
61 Sec. 8, Treas. Dept. Cir. no. 230, 6 (1934).
62 Sec. 9, ibid., 9-13. The names of those disbarred, followed by the cause, are published in
the Treasury Decisions. See 65 Treasury Decisions 1791 (i934).
63 Sec. 12, Regs. Dept. Int. Governing the Recognition of Agents and Attys. S (1927);
Circs. and Regs. of Gen. Land Office 173 (1930). Note 37, supra; 9 Land Decisions 520 (1889).
64 42 Stat. 39o (1922); 35 U.S.C.A. § ii (1929). See also Waterman, The Federal Bar, 20
Am. Bar Assn. J. 762, 763 (1934), note 3.
6s Act of July 8, 187o. c. 230, § 17; U.S. Rev. Stat. § 487 (1875).
12 Stat. 247 (i8f).
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Patent Office are described in the rules of practice as "patent attorneys,"
though these earlier statutes used the term "patent-agents." 67
The rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Board of Tax
Appeals, and the Federal Trade Commission provide for notice and hear-
ing in disbarment proceedings. In general, if the commission finds that
the agent or attorney is lacking in the requisite qualifications to represent
others, or "is lacking in character, integrity, or is guilty of unprofessional
conduct" it may in its discretion disbar or suspend him.
Not only does the power to disbar rest in the discretion of the adminis-
trative agencies, but this power when vested in department secretaries
may be delegated under certain conditions to subordinate officials. It has
been held that if a member of a departmental bar has had a hearing before
a subordinate of the department, and the ruling is subsequently approved
by the secretary of the department, the member is not entitled to a hear-
ing before the secretary.6 8 It has also been held that the approval of the
disbarment ruling may be delegated to a subordinate in the department,
such as an assistant secretary, if he has been authorized by congressional
act to perform the duties of the secretary. 9
VI
The fact that the federal administrative bars are composed of both
lawyers and non-lawyers has given rise to two interesting situations in
state courts involving state statutes on the practice of law. An attorney
at law, engaged both in the general practice of law in Arizona and as a
representative of claimants before the United States Land Office in that
state70 had advertised, thus following a custom of land office agents. This
custom while apparently sanctioned by the Department of the Interior 7l
is a violation of the code of ethics of the American Bar Association. Under
the law of Arizona a violation of these canons by an attorney at law con-
stituted grounds for disbarment. 72 The attorney at law defended his ac-
tions in part on the ground that practice before the land office was not to
67 See note 33, supra.
6
s United States e rel. Wedderburn v. Bliss, 12 App. D.C. 485 (r898).
69 Robertson, Comm. of Patents v. United States ex rd. Baff, 285 Fed. 911, 914 (App.
D.C. 1922). See 48 C. J. 173 (1929).
70 12 Stat. 409 (1862); 43 U.S.C.A. § 121 (1929); i Hughes, Federal Practice 163 (I93I).
71 The Secretary of the Interior may exclude from practice before his department any per-
son "who shall with intent to defraud in any manner, deceive, mislead, or threaten any claim-
ant, or prospective claimant, by word, circular, letter, or by advertisement." 23 Stat. I
(x884); 5 U.S.C.A. § 493 (1927).
72 Ariz. Rev. Code 1928, § 201. See also 55 A. L. R. 1313 (1928).
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be considered as practice of law. The state supreme court refused to ac-
cept this argument and held that his behavior justified disbarment.73
In Arizona, therefore, in the absence of any federal administrative regu-
lation, an agent who is a member of an administrative bar may advertise
whereas the attorney at law who is a member of the same administrative
bar will be disbarred by the state if he advertises in relation to his federal
administrative practice. In turn, disbarment by a court of record of a
state is often made grounds for disbarment by the federal administrative
agency.74
It should not be inferred that the rules of administrative bars permit
advertising without restriction. The acts of 1884, pertaining to the bars
of the Treasury and Interior Departments,75 and also the act of 1922 per-
taining to the Patent Office, provide for the suspension of any attorney or
agent who uses deceptive or misleading advertising76 The rules of the
Treasury Department on improper advertising are quite detailed.7 7 By
the rules of the Patent Office a registered patent attorney must submit to
the Commissioner of Patents for his approval every proposed advertising
matter, circular, letter, or card, intended to solicit patent business. A
violation of this rule is ground for suspension or disbarment78
In another state case,79 a person had held himself out as a patent law
attorney, a counsel in patent causes, and a solicitor of American and for-
eign patents, and also advertised that he would represent parties in pen-
sions and in claims against the government. This person was held to have
violated the state statute making it contempt of court for any one to hold
himself out as an attorney, an attorney at law or counselor at law without
having a license from the Supreme Court of the State.
The reported decision does not reveal whether this person had been ad-
mitted to practice before any of the government departments. If he had
been, the validity of a state statute which in effect prohibits an act of a
federal administrative practitioner sanctioned by a federal administrative
agency would present an interesting question.
If this person had not been admitted to practice before the Patent
Office, under federal law he was immune, as there is no federal law pro-
73 In re Gibbs, 35 Ariz. 346, 278 Pac. 371 (1929).
74 Sec. 9(2), Treas. Dept. Circ. no. 230, 9 (1934).
75 23 Stat. 258, iox (I884); 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 261, 493 (1927).
2642 Stat. 390 (1922); 35 U.S.C.A. § ix (i929).
77 Sec. 9, Treas. Dept. Circ. no. 230, 12-13 (1934).
78 Rule 17(h), Rules of Practice, U.S. Pat. Off. 5 (I935); Ann. Rep., Comm. Pat. 4 (1925).
79 People ex rd. Colorado Bar Assn. v. Erbaugh, 42 Colo. 480, 94 Pac. 349 (x9o8); Colo.
Comp. L. 1921, § 60'7. See note 27, sg4ra.
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hibiting one from holding himself out as authorized to practice as a patent
attorney. In 1930 it was pointed out that if persons who had not been
registered as practitioners by the Patent Office, or who had been disbarred
from that practice, held themselves out as patent attorneys, the Commis-
sioner of Patents was not empowered to take actionS0
In this Colorado case, if it had not been for the ruling of the state court,
the party holding himself out as an attorney could have done so with im-
punity so far as restrictive federal statutes were concerned. In this situ-
ation, it seems that there is need of a federal statute prohibiting an un-
authorized person from holding himself out as being a member of a federal
administrative bar or entitled to practice before federal administrative
agencies.
An act has been under consideration by Congress for some years which
would confine applicants for admission to the bar of the Patent Office to
those admitted to the bar of a state court or of the District of Columbia.
This act would make it unlawful for any one to hold himself out as a pat-
ent attorneys' who was not duly enrolled as such.12
VII
With one exception83 each of the administrative bars discussed consists
of two types of members, attorneys at law and others.8 4 In some situa-
tions, however, it becomes necessary to secure the services of an attorney
at law authorized to practice before federal or state courts. Suppose that
an administrative proceeding begins with a departmental ruling, s is fol-
lowed by a review by an administrative court,86 and is then appealed to a
so Ann. Rep., Comm. Pat. 4 (1925); H. R. Rep. no. 728, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. no. 919i
(1930); Sen. Rep. no. 626, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. no. 9r86 (1930).
For the English law prohibiting a person not registered from describing himself as a
"patent-agent," see: Institute of Patent Agents and Others v. Lockwood, [1894] A. C. 347;
22 Halsbury, Laws of England 230 (1912); 36 Eng. and Emp. Digest 856 (1927).
81 See notes 33 and 67, supra.
92 H. R. Rep. no. 715, 69 Cong., ist Sess., ser. no. 8532 (1926); Sen. Rep. no. 554, 72 Cong.,
ist Sess., ser. no. 9487 (1932); notes 8o and 57, supra.
83 Notes 39, 40, 41, supra.
84By the rules of the Treasury Department a member of the treasury bar, who is not a
lawyer, may not draft a written instrument transferring title to realty or personalty for the
purpose of affecting federal taxes or pass on the legal sufficiency or legal effect of such an instru-
ment. Sec. 2(f), Treas. Dept. Circ. no. 230, 2 (1934).
s Clark, Departmental Practice: Admission of Attorneys, 9 Am. Bar Assn. J. 706 (1923);
i Hughes, Federal Practice § 297 (I931), note 25; 65 C. J. 1273 (1933).
86 Note 20, Supra.
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federal court8 7 At this stage it becomes necessary to secure the services of
an attorney at law, if the representatives in the two earlier stages are
not lawyers.
For example after a taxpayer has filed his income tax return, the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, a unit of the Treasury Department, makes an in-
vestigation. The bureau may rule that additional income taxes should be
paid. The taxpayer may be represented before the bureau either by an
attorney at law or agent "enrolled" in the Treasury Department bar."8
If the taxpayer desires a review of the ruling of the bureau, requiring
that he pay a deficiency, he must petition the Board of Tax Appeals.89
Before the Board of Tax Appeals, the taxpayer may be represented by an
attorney at law or certified public accountant registered by the bar of that
board. If the taxpayer desires a review of the ruling of the Board of Tax
Appeals he must petition one of the ten circuit courts of appeal or the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. 9° Since only attorneys at
law are permitted to practice before these courts, at this stage the tax-
payer must secure the services of an attorney qualified to appear before
one of these federal courts.9'
Under the rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission a person may
be represented by either an attorney at law or an agent. If such person
petitions the commission to award him money damages against a carrier
for violation of the Interstate Commerce Act, the commission may make
such an award, known as a reparation order.92 If the carrier does not com-
87 Comm. of Internal Revenue v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 59 F. (2d) 320 (C. C. A. 6th
1932). For a discussion of this case see r Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 121 (1932).
88 The taxpayer, if he desires, may present his case to an internal revenue agent in the field.
26 U.S.C.A. § 12, 42 Stat. 1444 (1923); 26 U.S.C.A. § 33, 43 Stat. 845 (1924); 26 U.S.C.A.
§§ IO45-io48, 44 Stat. 55 (1926); Montgomery, Federal Tax Handbook 8o6 (i934-35);
Hamel, U.S. Board of Tax Appeals, Practice and Evidence 21, 22 (1926); Ann. Rep., Sec'y of
Treas. zo3 (1934); Bureau of Int. Rev., Inst. of Govt. Research 184 (1923).
The taxpayer, even in the field, must be represented by an agent or attorney duly enrolled.
Secs. 2(b), 6, Treas. Dept. Circ. no. 230, 1, 5 (1934).
89 45 Stat. 872 (1928); 26 U.S.C.A. § 1219 (1928).
90 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1225, 1226 (1928); 12 Am. Bar Assn. J. 686, 689 (1926); Rule 43, Rules of
the U.S.C.C.A. for the 8th Cir. 19 (193s); Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Su-
preme Court 247 (1928), note 94; 3 Hughes, Federal Practice § 1495 (193i).
9' Admission to practice before the Treasury Department does not carry the right to prac-
tice before the Board of Tax Appeals, nor does admission to practice before the Board give the
right to practice before the Treasury Department. Hamel, U.S. Board of Tax Appeals, Prac-
tice and Evidence 32, 49 (1926).
92 49 U.S.C.A. § 13(i) (1929); 44 Ann. Rep., I. C. C. 90 (1930); McFarland, Judicial Con-
trol of the Federal Trade Commission and Inter-State Commerce Commission 122, 162 (I933);
L. & N. R. R. v. Sloss-Sheffield Co., 269 U.S. 217 (1925). See also Smith, Justice and the Poor
92 (1924).
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ply with this order for payment of money, the complainant may file a pe-
tition in a federal district court or a state court of general jurisdiction to
obtain an enforcement of the order.93 It is evident that in this situation
the claimant, if represented before the commission by one not an attorney,
must before filing his petition in a state or federal court employ an attor-
ney at law.
The Special Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar
Association recommended in 1934 that in general the independent or
separate federal boards and commissions be abolished 94 and that their
executive and legislative functions95 be transferred to the several executive
departments of the federal government. In order to divest federal ad-
ministrative agencies of their judicial functions the establishment of a
Federal Administrative Court was recommended. 9 6 This Administrative
Court would at least absorb the existing jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims,97 and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,98 and also the
jurisdiction of the ten circuit courts of appeal and of the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia as pertains to review of the decisions of the
Board of Tax Appeals.99
At present only attorneys at law may practice before the ten circuit
courts of appeals or the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia or
before the Court of Claims."°° Likewise, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals permits parties to be represented only by attorneys at law.oI Is
practice before this court, if it is to be established, to be confined to attor-
neys at law or will its bar be considered an administrative one and open to
all those possessing the necessary qualifications to render valuable service
to their clients and otherwise competent to assist and advise their clients
in presenting their case before the court?X
0 2
93 49 U.S.C.A. § 16(2) (1929); Lewis-Simas-Jones Co. v. S. P. R. R., 283 U.S. 654 (1931).
94 59 Rep. Am. Bar Assn. 539, 540, 551 (1934).
9Ibid. 545.
9Ibid. 551. See also 58 ibid. 412, 426 (1933); McGuire, Proposed Reforms in Judicial Re-
views of Federal Administrative Action, i9 Am. Bar Assn. j. 471 (1933).
9736 Stat. 1139 (1011); 28 U.S.C.A. § 263 (1928).
99 45 Stat. 1476 (1928); 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 3o a, 3o9 a (1928).
9944 Stat. 11o (1926); 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1225, 1226 (1928).
xoo Rule 2, Rules of Ct. of Claims i (I93i); Rule 7, Rules of Ct. of App. D.C. 14 (1927).
10, Rule 2, 19 U.S. Ct. of Customs and Pat. App. Rep. 427, 1329 (1932).
102 Even though the Board of Tax Appeals has been described as an administrative court,
its bar is open to certified public accountants. Notes 2o and 38, supra.
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VIII
Despite the long continued and detailed discussion of standards of legal
education and of admission and disbarment in relation to the bars of
courts, little attention has been paid to these matters in relation to ad-
ministrative bars. If administrative agencies are to continue to increase
either in number or the scope of their powers, it seems that more con-
sideration should be given to the educational qualifications of these bars,
to admission requirements, the method of passing on such qualifications,
codes of ethics, and disbarment proceedings.
The same decentralized system of admission and disbarment which
characterizes the federal judicial bar 0 3 obtains for federal administrative
bars; and for both there is lack of uniformity in rules and also much diffi-
culty in securing information about the rules.104
In conclusion, it is submitted, that a recommendation of the Special
Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar Association
merits continued consideration in view of the present status of the rules
pertaining to federal administrative bars. The recommendation reads:
Conditions on admission to practice before administrative tribunals should be har-
monized and made generally applicable, the machinery for discipline and disbarment
should be unified and strengthened, and high standards of professional conduct should
be established and rigorously enforced.os
X03 Waterman, The Federal Bar: A Decentralized System of Admission and Disbarment,
2o Am. Bar Assn. J. 762 (1934).
104 Note 6, supra. "Both in original and appellate tribunals there is everywhere evident an
extreme lack of uniformity in practice and procedure, in conditions (if any) imposed upon ad-
mission to practice, and in other important respects." Report of Special Committee on Ad-
ministrative Law, 58 Rep. Am. Bar Assn. 407, 414 (1933). See also: Griswold, Government in
Ignorance of the Law-A Plea for Better Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 Harv. L.
Rev. 198, 214 (1934); Fairlie, Administrative Legislation, i8 Mich. L. Rev. i8, 197 (1920);
Walker, Law Making in the United States 453-458 (1934).
10s 59 Rep. Am. Bar Assn. 539, 540 (I934).
